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A number of recent international studies have reported the growing electoral 
success of populist parties among younger age groups. In this study, authors 
analysed the “breeding ground” for populism among the youth in Zagreb us-
ing the results of the Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement 
(MYPLACE) project in Croatia. A mixed methods approach was employed with 
thematic analysis of 61 semi-structured interviews and regression analysis on 
a survey sample data of 1,216 young people aged 16–25. Qualitative analysis 
indicated analogies to Cas Mudde’s three core concepts of populism (the “good 
people”, the “bad elite” and the “general will”) among interviewees’ opinions. 
In addition, common ideological features of populism (nationalism and radical 
egalitarianism) were to a degree present among the interviewees’ attitudes. In the 
quantitative part of this paper, the authors narrowed the analysis of populism to 
the radical right variant of populism, and – given the lack of prominent populist 
actors in Croatia – to support of ideas rather than political parties. The attitude 
towards a political system with a strong leader not constrained by parliament was 
chosen as the outcome since it holds significant populist potential in contempo-
rary democracies. Analyses showed the connection of the anti-elite, anti-systemic 
attitudes – as well as authoritarianism and a few right-wing political attitudes – 
with the strong leader preference. Both qualitative and quantitative results of this 
study indicated that the “breeding ground” for populism exists among the youth 
in Zagreb. Additional research is required to further examine that complex and 
previously unexplored topic.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Populism and democracy – A complex relationship
Populism widely considered to be an elusive phenomenon and, due to 
the complex relationship it has with the concepts of democracy and the 
“people” (populus), it is often (mis)used in public and media discourses 
about politics.1 In the scientific discourse, it is still, to a degree, a con-
tested concept, and theorists consider it to be a political strategy (e.g. 
Weyland), a special kind of ideology (e.g. Mudde) or even the very logic 
of the political (e.g. Laclau).2 Throughout this study, authors combine in-
sights from perspectives formulated by Laclau and Mudde, using Laclau’s 
work as a broader way to think about populism and Mudde’s minimal 
approach to operationalise and investigate the empirical reality regarding 
the phenomenon.
In Mudde’s (2004: 543) influential approach, populism rests upon three 
core concepts: the “good people”, the “bad elite” and the “general will”. 
Populist political actors claim that politics should be a “crystallisation” of 
the united political will, a true manifestation of the unambiguous will of 
the people. Populists proclaim that only they can directly and unequivocally 
represent the people, in a manner seemingly free of politics in the form of 
“business as usual”. They strive to make an ideological divide in society, 
a distinction between two unrealistically homogenised groups: “us” – the 
good and the righteous “people” (which includes the populist actor), and 
“them” – the bad and corrupted “elite”. In that interpretation, the “bad 
elite” are basically all the other “players” in the political field, usually 
combined with some further “unwanted others”, such as immigrants or mi-
norities (primarily in the radical right variant of populism), or big finance/
multinationals (common in the radical left variant of populism; e.g. Za-
slove, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013; Meny and Surel, 
2002; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Panizza, 2005).
1 In Croatia, the term “populism” appears in various contexts, amongst which are “as a 
rhetorical instrument aimed at the disqualification of the political opponents; in media 
discourse as the inflammatory label attached to disparate phenomena; as a political iden-
tification of those politicians which try to envision an image of activist close to the people 
and opposed to the obnoxious political elites” (Zakošek, 2015). Only the last one is close 
to the strict scientific definition of what populism in its pure form really is. In media use, 
the explanation of the word “populism” is usually missing.
2 For the discussion on differences between theoretical perspectives on populism, see Kalt-
wasser (2012) and Gidron and Bonikowski (2013).
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Populism thrives during periods of crisis, and it has been established 
that “some degree of [crisis] is a necessary precondition for populism” 
(Laclau, 2005b: 191). This is particularly true in a crisis of political rep-
resentation, during which great parts of the population feel that their in-
terests and demands are not being represented in the political arena (e.g. 
Mouffe, 2013). Contemporary populism is an exceptionally relevant phe-
nomenon, and the results of the elections for the European parliament in 
2014, as well as the results of many populist parties at national elections, 
are apparently a herald of the “new strength” of populist forces in Europe 
(Mudde, 2015).
Laclau argues that populism requires two conditions to arise: “the di-
chotomisation of the social space through the creation of an internal fron-
tier” (the “us” and “them” divide) and “the construction of an equivalential 
chain between unfulfilled social and political demands” (Laclau, 2005a: 
38). The link between unfulfilled social and political demands is depend-
ent upon the construction of floating or empty signifiers (Laclau, 2005b). 
Signifiers are, according to Laclau (2005b), the condensations of some as-
pects of popular identity that signify the chain of unfulfilled demands and 
unite them in a political idea. They are built around common symbols and 
ideological constructs with great political power in a given society.
Thus, while it relies on a small number of core concepts (Mudde, 
2004), populism needs to have core ideological contents and is often de-
fined as a “thin-centred ideology” (Freeden, 1998). Ideologies like nativ-
ism, neoliberalism, imperialism and radical egalitarianism power its signi-
fiers and arise from them. Because of the heterogeneity of possible core 
contents and signifiers, populism is necessarily a very diverse phenomenon, 
displaying high dependence on the specific political and cultural context.
Regarding the diversity of forms of populism, it is not surprising that 
there are different interpretations of its character. Certainly, to regard pop-
ulism as exclusively an “underside of democracy” (Panizza, 2005) would 
be wrong; as famously put forth by Laclau (2005b: 67), populism is a 
component of all politics, the very “political logic” (Laclau, 2005b: 117). 
One way of achieving more clarity is to make an ideal-typical distinction 
between populism in “mainstream politics” and populism in radical politics. 
By radical politics, we mean the politics that is opposed to fundamental 
values of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2007). Radical populist actors fit into 
the three aforementioned populist core concepts (Mudde, 2004) and bring 
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about the described radicalisation of the political (and social) field. Popu-
lists in mainstream politics, despite using some of the common populist 
tactics, hold on to the pluralist political system of liberal democracy and 
the representative institutions and do not strive for the radical dichotomisa-
tion of the political space.3
Regarding its ideological contents, European populism in the 2010s is 
in most cases a phenomenon on the political right, exclusionary in its char-
acter, which mobilises on grievances over ethnicity and immigration and 
combines populism with nativism (or radical nationalism) and some forms 
of authoritarianism (Rydgren, 2007; Mudde, 2007). Populism on the politi-
cal left has so far been less frequent and less important in Europe.4. How-
ever, parties like SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain have shown 
that left, liberal and inclusionary populism can gain nation-wide support 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013), al-
beit faced with great difficulties when they gain power (e.g. the case of 
SYRIZA). However, because both types of populism exclude and include 
parts of the population,5 it is important to be aware of the complexity of 
the labels “left” and “right” and “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” in the 
context of populism.
The role of the strong and charismatic populist leader is particularly 
important for the phenomenon of populism (Canovan, 1999; Panizza, 2005; 
Laclau, 2005a; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). Populist leaders usually 
present themselves as having a direct link to the “people”, a connection 
which seemingly enables them to represent the “general will” in a manner 
that strives to bypass representative democratic processes (Panizza, 2005; 
Arditi, 2005), and in that sense, the institution of the parliament and the 
liberal-democratic system of “checks-and-balances”. A populist leader can 
become the centre of the entire political project, to the point that the ho-
3 Among the common mainstream populist tactics are special identification and calls upon 
the people, attempts to construct a special link with the people as a homogenised group, 
efforts to win over large populations by saying “whatever the people want to hear” (Arditi, 
2005), the use of popular signifiers in political discourse (Laclau, 2005b) and the use of 
media in tabloid-like politics (Canovan, 1999).
4 Aside from the three populist core concepts, left populism usually shares values of 
anti-neoliberalism, social justice, some variant of social democracy and a welfare state 
or democratic socialism and acknowledgment of ecological and gender issues (March and 
Mudde, 2005; March, 2012).
5 For example, the welfare chauvinism ideology is common for radical right populism in 
Europe (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013: 167).
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mogenising function of the populus is “carried out [only] by a pure name: 
the name of the leader” (Laclau, 2005a: 40).
In its radical form, populism can be regarded as a warning signal about 
the weaknesses, under-represented demands and passions in a given demo-
cratic system (Mouffe, 2013). It can be “both a threat to and a corrective 
for democracy” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013: 168). However, we must 
not forget that, according to Laclau (2005a, 2005b), every political project 
is in a way populist.
This study is focused on examining the demand-side analysis of pop-
ulism among the youth in Zagreb, the Croatian capital. A potential demand 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of populists 
(Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2005) because the other half rests on 
supply-side explanations, which deal with the internal dynamics of popu-
list parties, the role of the populist leader, as well as the broader political 
opportunity structure (a complex mix of institutional, political and cultural 
factors; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). In that regard, demand-side analysis 
tries to “explain why and which people constitute the potential electorate 
of populist” parties (Mudde, 2007: 230).
1.2. Populism and democracy in Croatia
Populism is an under-researched phenomenon in Croatia. Only a few au-
thors have published papers dealing with the concept (e.g. Milardović, 
2004; Zakošek, 2010; Šalaj, 2012; Grbeša and Šalaj, 2014). Milardović 
(2004) holds that Croatia had three types of populism in the 20th century: 
the right-wing populist dictatorship of Ante Pavelić during the Independent 
state of Croatia period (1941–1945), the left-wing populist dictatorship of 
Josip Broz Tito during the socialist Yugoslav “Tito period” (1945–1980) 
and the semi-democratic/semi-authoritarian populism during the Franjo 
Tuđman period (1991–1999). The “Tuđman period” is closest to what was 
considered populism in the 2010s, because it was part of a national state 
democratic multi-party political system. Mudde (2007: 280) states that the 
rule of Franjo Tuđman as the strong leader in a semi-presidential system 
was a rare example of the populist radical right government in Europe. 
However, this case was “highly specific, as the country was in a defensive 
war for most of that period, and many of the most negative aspects of the 
regime were at least in part a reaction to largely similar actions and attacks 
by Milošević’s Yugoslavia/Serbia” (Mudde, 2007: 279–280).
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The authoritarian socialist legacy, the formidable task of triple transi-
tion6 after the destructive war (1990–1995), the semi-democratic populist 
government legacy from the time of war and in the war’s aftermath and 
the rise of ethno-nationalism and conflicts provoked after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia all together make a fertile “breeding ground” for populism in 
Croatia. Nevertheless, at the time of the signing of the European Union 
accession treaty in 2011, the democratisation of the political actors and 
democratic consolidation was evident (Dolenec, 2013). One of the most 
important factors in Croatian democratic consolidation was the role of the 
European Union (Dolenec, 2013; Beširević, 2012) as a powerful external 
factor for democratisation and liberalisation, both political and economic 
(Mudde, 2002; Merkel, 2004).
Still, due to its elusiveness, populism can go “under the radar”, and 
the first supply-side empirical research on populism in Croatia (Grbeša and 
Šalaj, 2014) used content analysis of interviews given by Croatian politi-
cians. Grbeša and Šalaj (2014) concluded that in the period of 2009–2015, 
there were few “real” populist political figures: Ivan Grubišić, Željko Kerum, 
Milan Kujundžić and Ivan Vilibor Sinčić. Additionally, analysis has found 
that Milan Bandić, a highly influential Croatian politician,7 is a border case 
between a “real” populist and a mainstream populist. Recent developments 
in the Croatian political field have shown the rise of the first populist politi-
cal party, Živi zid.8 For a few months in 2015 (January–May) the polls gave 
the third ranking in Croatia to a political party practically without politi-
cal experience and with very strong anti-institutionalist discourse. However, 
several months before the November elections, voters shifted their (protest) 
vote to others, resulting in only one seat in the 2015 parliament.
In conclusion, it can be said that the Croatian political space recently 
started to show high volatility, and that populist protest parties (particularly 
6 See, for example, in Offe and Adler, 1991.
7 Milan Bandić is a four-term mayor of Zagreb and runner-up in the 2010 presidential 
elections.
8 Political programme of Živi zid [Human Shield] and its leader Ivan Vilibor Sinčić can 
be described as radical and populist, combining left and right ideological components in 
a strong critique of political and economic elites, European union and capitalism. Živi zid 
called upon “ordinary people” or “impoverished Croats” in the crunch of foreign big-mon-
ey interests for its legitimacy. Ivan Vilibor Sinčić advocated the restoration of the semi-
presidential system in Croatia and quoted Victor Orbán and Vladimir Putin as influences 
(thus displaying certain authoritarian tendencies), but also Mahatma Gandhi (Kasapović, 
2015).
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the mainstream, but also the radical ones) proved that they can be at least 
moderately successful.
1.3. The youth in Croatia and politics
Croatian citizens who were born at the end of or after the 1980s have lit-
tle experience of the populism and political radicalism of Croatia’s recent 
past. They were born in the years strongly shaped and influenced by the 
Homeland War9 (1991–1995) and by the transition from the socialist politi-
cal system to the parliamentary democracy. They have experienced a trou-
blesome ethno-national, political and economic transition period that has 
continued throughout the 1990s and the beginning of 21st century. These 
political and structural changes have placed young people into an ambiva-
lent situation towards the future, making them known as the “sceptical 
generation” (Tomić-Koludrović, 1999) or even more directly “the losers” 
(Ilišin, 2004).
Young people in Croatia face economic crisis and an unsecure future, 
with the third greatest youth unemployment rate in the European Union, 
with only Greece and Spain having higher rates at the time this research 
was undertaken (Eurostat, 2014). Some studies (e.g. Mustapić and Karajić, 
2013) have indicated that unemployment and economic crisis are the two 
main issues young people emphasised as the most distinctive problems pre-
sent in contemporary Croatian society. These are among the main reasons 
for youths’ aversion towards Croatian political parties and alienation from 
politics in general, which leads young people to declare themselves “apo-
litical” (Mustapić and Karajić, 2013).
Furthermore, studies show (Ilišin, 1999, 2004, 2006; Gvozdanović, 
2011, 2014) that young people are politically marginalised in terms of their 
political participation in government institutions and political organisations, 
and they have very low overall trust in institutions (Sekulić and Šporer, 
2010; Ilišin et al., 2013; Franc and Međugorac, 2015; Gvozdanović, 2015). 
Partly because of these factors, there is a low level of political participation 
of young people (Ilišin, 2004) and a lack of certain types of civil activ-
ism among the youth (Franc, Šakić and Maričić, 2007). In addition, most 
9 The Homeland war (or the War for Croatian Independence) was a part of the Wars of the 
Yugoslav secession or the Yugoslav wars (1991–2001). As scientific debate on the termi-
nology is still in progress, the authors have decided to employ the term most commonly 
used in the Croatian political and public discourse, the Homeland war.
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of the young people in Croatia think that their generational interests are 
poorly represented (Ilišin et al., 2013; Gvozdanović, 2014), which could 
be related to Laclau’s idea of the chain of unfulfilled demands that is a 
perquisite for the rise of populism. Ilišin and her associates (2013) clarified 
that poor participation by the youth in formal politics is not replaced by 
greater involvement in civil society; rather, it indicates increasingly apoliti-
cal attitudes toward modern politics. Moreover, speaking about democratic 
potentials among young people, Ilišin (2015) referred to the paradox of 
having young people that are raised in a democratic political system, but 
show declining support for democratic order. Thus, young people without 
much political experience could be a group more open to voting for “pro-
test parties” and populist actors because they are alienated from the politi-
cal system. Furthermore, youth are under the processes of precarisation and 
rising insecurity, which can also lead to voting for radical political options 
(Norris, 2005). Various studies have found that the right-wing populists 
have more electoral success among younger age groups (Zaslove, 2008; 
Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers, 2012), as well as amongst those who are 
unemployed (Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers, 2012).
1.4. The aims of the study
This study aimed to explore the inclinations to populism among young 
people and to understand their sources, i.e. to establish whether there is 
a “breeding ground” for populism among youth in Zagreb. To the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, this is the first demand-side study of populism in 
Croatia. This study draws upon the methods and results of the Memory, 
Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE) project, a 
mixed methods research effort.
Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews was the foundation 
of the study, and these interviews were used to examine various compo-
nents of youths’ opinions and inclinations towards populism, namely:
a) interviewees’ perception of populism and populist strategies in ma-
instream politics;
b) the analogies to the three core concepts of populism as formulated 
by Mudde (2004);
c) the perception of the “usual suspect” ideologies (e.g. nativism, neo-
liberalism, radical egalitarianism), which are the possible contents of 
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populism (Mudde, 2004) and can also be regarded as the “inspiration” 
for the creation of signifiers (Laclau, 2005b);
d) the support for the idea of a strong leader of the state who is above 
the usual political process, and is, in a way, not constrained by the in-
stitution of parliament, which is a very important component of radical 
populist politics (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Panizza, 2005; Laclau 2005b; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008).
In the quantitative part of the paper, analyses were narrowed and fo-
cused to a single dimension of populism, its radical right variant. Due to 
the politico-historical moment in which the MYPLACE project was con-
ceptualised (2010–2011), the survey section on populism aimed primarily 
to capture the radical right dimension of the phenomenon.10 Conceptually, 
it adopted Mudde’s (2007) characterisation of radical populist right ideolo-
gies as combining nativism, populism and authoritarianism, clearly display-
ing the complexity of capturing the phenomenon of populism using the 
survey methods.11
The existing international literature on the quantitative aspects of the 
demand side of populism is based largely on past voting patterns or vot-
ing intentions of the general population. However, because there were no 
prominent radical populist parties at the time of the survey in Croatia, the 
authors decided to move from the terrain of the support for parties to the 
support of ideas. Accordingly, the aim of the quantitative analysis was to 
examine the associations of a battery of radical right populism indicators 
(the predictor variables) to the type of political radicalism that supports 
a political system with a strong leader not constrained by parliament (the 
outcome variable). The authors interpreted support for such a system as 
an inclination towards authoritarian rule and, thus, a radical political sys-
tem that can be formed on a substantial populist core, or, in other words, 
can use a populist mode of communication/mobilisation. Radical right 
populist leaders in developed democracies usually attempt to hide their 
authoritarian leadership strategies under the idea of the “will of the peo-
ple”, aiming to legitimise themselves as the only “true” democrats. It is 
10 It was a time marked mainly by right-wing populism (in Europe and North America) 
and studies followed the political reality to a degree that many authors in the West have 
interpreted the phenomenon of populism as inseparable from radical right politics.
11 A more detailed operationalisation of the phenomenon of populism was proposed by 
Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014).
Rev za soc 2016-2.indb   149 11.12.2016.   19:37:56
Augustin Derado, Vanja Dergić, Vanja Međugorac: Croatian Youth..., Revija za sociologiju 46 (2016), 2: 141–173
150
recognised that populism “emerges from within democratic politics, [...] 
as a ‘misfire’ whereby populism can morph all too easily into authoritari-
anism” (Arditi, 2005: 77). Moreover, populist projects, by the power of 
the cult of personality, “can transform leaders into quasi-messianic figures 
for whom accountability is not a relevant issue, and the populist disregard 
for institutional checks and balances can encourage rule by decree and all 
sorts of authoritarian behaviour while maintaining a democratic façade” 
(Arditi, 2005: 95).
Given the strength of populist actors across Europe on the one hand, 
and on the other hand recognising the broad legitimacy that the idea of 
democracy still holds, particularly in the European Union as the promoter 
of democracy, the most probable type of radical or “border-democratic” 
project for Croatia is also some form of populism. As already emphasised, 
radical right populism is just one dimension of populism. That is the reason 
for embedding the quantitative part of the analysis into the broad qualita-
tive interpretative findings the study.
2. Method
2.1. Research project
This study drew upon the methods and data from the MYPLACE project, 
an international Framework Programme 7 (FP7) project (2011–2015).12 
Research was conducted in 14 European states and included 16 scientific 
institutions. The main research goals of the project were to examine incli-
nations towards totalitarianism and populism among European youth, as 
well as their understanding of civic and political needs, opportunities and 
perspectives. The target group was young people aged 16 to 25. That age 
group is of particular importance for the populism research as Europeans 
younger than 25 did not directly experience radical political systems. MY-
PLACE has utilised a mixed methods approach. In the following sections 
its quantitative and qualitative methods are briefly described.
2.2. Quantitative method
In each of the 14 countries involved in the MYPLACE project, two con-
trasting locations were selected for conducting the quantitative part of the 
research. In Croatia, a survey was conducted in two districts of Zagreb, 
12 For more information about the project: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/concept.php. For re-
ports and resources for researchers: https://myplaceresearch.wordpress.com/reports/.
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Podsljeme and Peščenica. For the purposes of this research, these loca-
tions were not treated as two subsamples but as a single research unit.13 
Random sampling was used on both locations, based on lists derived from 
administrative sources. Attempts to conduct individual surveys were made 
by visiting the households, and in order to minimise non-response, a mini-
mum of three contact attempts was made. The survey was conducted from 
September until December 2012 on a total of 1,216 participants.14
2.3. Qualitative method
The qualitative approach of the MYPLACE project was informed by 
Burawoy’s (2009) extended case method. The qualitative part of the re-
search employed various techniques, including semi-structured interviews 
designed to capture the meanings that young people in Zagreb attach to 
their social and political attitudes.15
Following the end of each survey, participants were asked to par-
ticipate in an interview. If they agreed, their survey results on questions 
of tolerance/liberalism and political participation were examined, and ac-
cording to these two criteria, a maximum variation interview sample was 
pursued (e.g. Creswell, 2013). The interview sample was broadened by 
13 Two locations were selected in order to capture social class differences among youth. 
Podsljeme is an affluent Zagreb district, whereas Peščenica is among the least well-off 
districts. Subsequent analyses showed that the two locations do not significantly differ 
with respect to social class (χ²(3) = 4.85, p > 0.05), which was derived from mothers’ 
and fathers’ education and occupation levels. However, differences between the two loca-
tions were established in measured attitudes. Specifically, in comparison with youth from 
Peščenica, youth from Podsljeme were more prone to violence justification (MPodsljeme = 
13.3, MPeščenica = 12.0; t(1092) = 2.69, p < 0.01), had higher trust in national institutions 
(MPodsljeme = 18.9, MPeščenica = 17.2; t(1160.4) = 2.86, p < 0.01), were more satisfied with 
the way democracy works in Croatia (MPodsljeme = 5.1; MPeščenica = 4.4, t(1167.0) = 4.95, p 
< 0.01), had more positive attitudes towards the role of religion in politics (MPodsljeme = 1.7, 
MPeščenica = 1.3; t(1130.2) = 4.88, p < 0.01) and had less positive attitudes towards minority 
groups (MPodsljeme = 11.7, MPeščenica = 12.5; t(1004) = 3.19, p < 0.01). For these reasons, the 
effect of location on preference for a strong leader was controlled for by including it in 
the first step of the regression analysis.
14 610 participants were from Podsljeme (the contact rate of 69.8% and the response rate 
of 45%) while 607 were from Peščenica (the contact rate of 49% and the response rate 
of 36%).
15 Interviews were designed around six thematic sections: political heritage and transmis-
sion, history and memory in everyday life, participation and understanding of “the politi-
cal”, culture and lifestyle, the language of politics and receptivity to populism/extremism. 
The questions followed a uniform project frame but were adjusted to the cultural and 
political specifics of every country and thus extended with specific questions and prompts.
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adding several members of the largest two political parties (HDZ and 
SDP)16 youth wings, youth active in city councils and several Roma in-
terviewees. Thus, the sampling procedure corresponded to a variant of the 
purposive sample (Yin, 2010). From the beginning of January 2013 until 
the end of April 2013, a total of 61 interviews were conducted, with an 
average length of 77 minutes. Interviews were conducted at participants’ 
homes or on the premises of the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar. 
Interviewees received a USB drive, both as an incentive and a gesture of 
gratitude for their time. Two of the study authors conducted data coding 
using NVivo 9 software. A primarily inductive approach was employed. 
Coded text was arranged into categories through the process of concep-
tual refinement.
Regarding generalisibility of qualitative results, it is reasonable to 
interpret the findings in the perspective of Yin’s (2003, 2010) analytical 
generalisation, in which “investigators show how their study’s findings are 
likely to inform a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, or hy-
pothesized sequence of events” (Yin, 2010: 100). Additionally, naturalis-
tic generalisations can be considered for this kind of approach and topic, 
i.e. generalisations by which “people can learn from the case [or multiple 
cases] either for themselves or to apply to a population of cases” (Creswell, 
2013: 163). Naturalistic generalisation, which is sometimes called “readers 
generalisability”, shifts the responsibility for making generalizations from 
the researcher to the reader (Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014).
3. Qualitative analysis results
In this section, the results of the qualitative analysis of interviews are pre-
sented, organised by theory-inspired points of concern as outlined in the 
aims of the study section.
3.1. The search for the “breeding ground” for populism: 
Croatia – A country of mainstream populism?
Only a minority of interviewees were familiar with the term populism, and 
they almost exclusively related it to mainstream populism. Although they 
were not familiar with the term, many of our interviewees recognised and 
16 HDZ is the acronym of the political party Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian 
Democratic Union) and SDP is the acronym of the political party Socijaldemokratska par-
tija Hrvatske (Social Democratic Party of Croatia).
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condemned a few of the most common populist tactics (or components of 
the populist style of communication) found in mainstream politics, as in 
these examples:
During those general election campaigns, they promise everything, 
they “promise the moon” “castles and fairies”, and when they are 
elected and gain power, all those issues which they promised to solve, 
half of those issues, they forget about them. (Majda)
You can see the parties that are selling their image, but, then again, it 
all goes up in smoke to me. (Majica)
In political parties, there’s a lot of populism too, I think in particular 
in HDZ. [...] It’s a problem, but I doubt it can be resolved; that’s like 
a necessary evil to me. Populism is a necessary evil of democracy, I 
guess. (Branimir)
Populism was not recognised as a “special phenomenon” but rather as 
a common characteristic of big parties. It was often perceived as an attrib-
ute arising from the weak state of the Croatian political system in general. 
On the whole, our interviewees were very disappointed in Croatian political 
institutions, politicians and political parties.
The few of our interviewees who did mention more obvious instanc-
es of populism primarily mentioned the case of Milan Bandić and Željko 
Kerum. Interviewees primarily viewed their political style as a more intense 
example of populism in mainstream politics. Few of them considered a 
high level of populism among the mainstream political parties as uniquely 
Croatian feature.
3.2. The search for the “breeding ground” for populism: The 
three core concepts of populism and the issue of mainstream 
populism
As mentioned previously, the core features of populism can be summed up 
in three concepts: the “bad elite”, the “good people” and the “general will” 
(Mudde, 2004). We analysed the interviews searching for political attitudes 
analogous to the core concepts of populism. Undoubtedly, if the potential 
electorate shares the core concepts (ideas) of populism, it is more suscep-
tible to populist political projects. In other words, the electorate would be-
come a potential “breeding ground” for the political and electoral demand 
of populist parties. The first concept, the perspective that the elite is cor-
rupted and “bad”, was almost undivided among our interviewees and quite 
strong, as vividly illustrated by the following quotes:
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Politicians, which are not doing anything, they have high salaries, they 
are corrupt, they steal from the people... from the people, from the 
state, they haven’t done anything good. (Didi)
They are all the same, yes! [...] They are all one and the same gang. 
(Vida)
Really, using his power [politicians, and particularly party leaders] 
over the people for his interest only and not for other people. (Hrvoje)
In contrast to the perspective on the political elite as corrupt, when 
discussing ideal politics, many of our interviewees stressed the need for a 
political system defined by greater emphasis on the needs of the so called 
ordinary people, which brings us to another core concept: the “general 
will”. This concept has its analogy in the views that the people should be 
listened to more and should have more influence on politics. Many of our 
interviewees displayed such views:
Maybe democracy should function better, the people should be consul-
ted more often, and the people should be listened to more. In fact, the 
politicians should be the ones that fulfil the wishes of the people, and 
not the other way around. (Ivan)
They [the politicians] decide about it all, but the people should be 
asked more often. They don’t ask us anything, only when we need to 
vote! (Mirkec)
Most of the interviewees held the opinion that the “will of the peo-
ple” can be unequivocally asserted in political practice. This frequent 
theme of the need to listen to/obey the “people” can also, to a degree, 
indicate a perception of the populus as a good and righteous political ac-
tor that should make the decisions directly. The “good people” concept 
in Mudde’s (2004) interpretation of populism is connected to the concept 
of “general will”, and cannot be viewed separately. Furthermore, in the 
case of this core concept, it is the role of the populist leader to unite the 
disparate political demands in the chain of equivalence (Laclau, 2005b). 
Logically, the core concept of “good people” cannot be as salient as the 
other two prior the rise of the populist political actors that call upon the 
“good people” and bring about the unification of the populus. Our analy-
ses indicated the relative strength of the populist core concepts among the 
interviewees’ political attitudes, indicating a potential “breeding ground” 
for populism.
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3.3. The search for the “breeding ground” for populism: The 
“usual suspects” ideologies
As already stated, populism is a thin-centred political ideology. It relies on 
a small number of core concepts and can come in combination with various 
ideologies. Therefore, the main radical ideologies that blend with populism 
must be understood and, in Laclau’s (2005b) terms, the ideas for the forma-
tion of signifiers must be provided. This study primarily focuses on xenopho-
bic nationalism17 and radical egalitarianism18 because these two ideologies 
are common core contents of international right-wing and left-wing populism 
and are important in the Croatian political and socio-historical context.
Many of our interviewees discussed the strong nationalism present 
among a certain part of the Croatian population and some discussed its 
connection to the Roman Catholic religion. For example:
The Croats are very sensitive to, I mean, to that “Croatian pride”, 
I mean, nationality, “we the Croats”, “God and the Croats”, that is 
strongly emphasized in the case of a great number of Croats. (Tara)
One of the most important factors of national identity for Croats is the 
Homeland War. As an ethnic conflict of grand scale, the event had a domi-
nant role in constructing the notion of “important others”, or in this case, 
the “unwanted others/enemies”, i.e. the Serbs. Our interviewees held that 
some degree of suspicion towards Serbs, and even animosity, still exists in 
a part of the population:
The hatred towards the Serbs, let’s say, it can be felt, the hatred exists. 
(Bob)
In addition, several of our interviewees displayed such attitudes them-
selves:
Because the Serbs, they always want some kind of quarrel. [...]. That 
means they always start something. (Vicko)
Such antagonistic views can “open the doors” for xenophobic and radi-
cal nationalist behaviour/ideas and make the context suitable for right-wing 
populism (Rydgren, 2007; Mudde, 2007). A few of our interviewees said 
that there could be a chance for some kind of radicalism in Croatia if eco-
nomic situation worsens even further, as clearly stated in this quote:
17 According to Laclau (2005b: 193), in Eastern Europe “an ethnic populism trying to 
enhance the particularism of the national values of specific communities” can primarily 
be found.
18 Radical egalitarianism was an ideological component of socialist states like Yugoslavia 
(1945–1990) and is an important core ideology of left-wing populism (March, 2012).
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Let’s say, if the standard of living fell even more, if the unemployment 
rose to maybe 500,000, there is clearly a ground for extreme parties 
to operate. This means that people are easily captivated by the na-
tionalistic enthusiasm here, and if the situation became any worse... 
(Branimir)
Radical egalitarian ideology has its historical connections with left-
wing political projects19 and an important historical legacy in Croatia. 
Many of our interviewees expressed nostalgia for a more egalitarian eco-
nomic system, or at least support for its fundamental elements, such as full 
employment, social housing, minimal social inequalities and overreaching 
economic and work security. In addition, most of our interviewees spoke 
negatively of the current economic situation and about the rising economic 
inequalities and poverty, which some perceive as the result of Croatia’s 
transition to a market economy and its accession to the European Union. 
Such views can be illustrated with the following quotes:
My parents always say that before privatisation everything was better, 
that more care was paid to the workers, that capitalism is really sla-
very now. My mother constantly works overtime in the company where 
she is employed, and never gets paid for that. (Arijana)
Huh, well, if it wasn’t for that period [the Yugoslav socialist period] 
we would not have the apartment which we own now. (Barbara).
Yugoslavia shouldn’t have been broken apart. Life was better during 
the Tito period. They say so. There was work for everybody. (Hrvojka)
The analyses showed that there is a clear foundation for egalitarian 
ideologies, perhaps even the radical ones. The broader analyses of three 
populist core concepts and two common core value ideologies indicated 
that there is a potential “breeding ground” for populism in Croatia.
3.4. The search for the “breeding ground” for populism: The 
“strong leader” issue
The role of the leader is essential for the concept of populism as populist 
leaders attempt to construct a special link with the people. They often aim 
to concentrate power and to disregard the political elites and democratic 
processes, at least when they are not in power. Several interviewees spoke 
explicitly about their preference for stronger leadership from a few people 
or even from one “strong leader”:
19 It should be repeated that exclusionary right-wing populism also makes use of egalitarian 
ideology, often by advocating for the chauvinist welfare state (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).
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I would get rid of all of them [politicians] and sometimes it really 
comes to me to, you know, to install one man, some kind of half-dicta-
torship, and things would really be better then. (Tara)
It would be better for us if we had someone like Putin, maybe a bit 
less radical. I wish that a person like him would take over and that 
all the power were concentrated in one person. Because now it is too 
much divided, and you have to settle with everybody, and that has lead 
us into this situation. (Dean)
To be honest, I think that in order to bring this state in order, I think 
that we need some kind of a (…) a regime where one person is in 
power. [...] I think that such person should be very well educated, with 
PhDs from several universities. First that, and then that person needs 
to be charismatic. [...] He does not need to be a 100% Croat, but at 
least one of his parents should be Croatian. (Barbara)
Our interviewees had various ideas about the nature of the rule of a 
strong leader. Some of them seem to resemble the populist rule, some a 
variant of a technocratic rule, and some resemble authoritarian rule. Most 
participants adopted a mixture of positions in their narratives. Akkerman, 
Mudde and Zaslove (2014: 1327) recognised that “populist and elitist ideas 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather might overlap to some 
extent”, and authoritarianism is one of the core features of radical right-
wing populist ideology (Mudde, 2007). In fact, all the strong leader vari-
ants are compatible with populism, even the technocratic one. Therefore, 
we hold that the “strong leader” issue is highly relevant for the analysis of 
populism, particularly the radical right populism with authoritarian tenden-
cies, a common type in Europe during the 2000s and 2010s (e.g. Mudde, 
2007).
4. Quantitative research
In this section, the quantitative aspect of this study is described along with 
the rationale for the selection of variables included in the regression model, 
the construction of measures and the results.
4.1. Rationale for the selection of the measured concepts
Populism thrives on anti-elitist and anti-systemic attitudes (Canovan, 
1999; Meny and Surel, 2002; Arditi, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 
2007), which are the crucial preferences of a populist electorate (Norris, 
2005). To assess anti-establishment and anti-elite attitudes, the attitudes 
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towards corruption among politicians, satisfaction with democracy and 
trust in national institutions were measured. As noted earlier, the sur-
vey design limited authors to measuring attitudinal constructs primarily 
associated with right-wing populism. Authoritarianism can also be con-
sidered important in explaining right-wing populist preferences (Mudde, 
2007, 2004; Flecker, 2004). As a measure of authoritarian attitudes, items 
on the justification of various types of politics-related violence were 
used.
To explore the prevalent political positioning of the youth, the left–
right political ideology scale was included. The success of right-wing pop-
ulism depends on radical nationalist or nativist attitudes and immigrant or 
ethnic grievances (Norris, 2005; Flecker, 2004; Van der Brug, Fennema and 
Tillie, 2005). The right-wing voters in Croatia have a stronger religious 
identity (Zakošek, 2010), so a measure of the attitude on the role of reli-
gious belief in politics was included. Measures of political knowledge and 
interest in politics were also included, even though both have ambivalent 
relationships to populism, political participation and voting (Soler-i-Martí, 
2015; Levendusky, 2011).
4.2. Measures
Preference for a strong leader not constrained by parliament was meas-
ured by a single item within a set of questions assessing the desirability of 
governance of various political systems. Participants were asked to evaluate 
the item “having a strong leader who is not constrained by parliament” on 
a four-point scale (from 0 = very bad to 3 = very good).
Gender, age, location and education were considered to be the most 
important socio-demographic variables, and their effect on outcome vari-
able was controlled for. Age, originally measured by date of birth, was 
later categorised into three categories (16–18, 19–21, and 22–25 years of 
age). Similarly, education – originally measured by 14 categories – was 
categorised into primary, secondary and tertiary level. Dummy coding was 
used before entering these measures into the regression equation. The low-
est category for both variables (16–18 years for age and primary level for 
education) was used as a reference category.
Satisfaction with democracy (“On the whole, how satisfied are you 
with the way democracy works in Croatia?”) and left-right ideology (“On 
the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right, would you say that 
Rev za soc 2016-2.indb   158 11.12.2016.   19:37:57
	 Augustin	Derado,	Vanja	Dergić,	Vanja	Međugorac:	Croatian	Youth...,	Revija	za	sociologiju	46	(2016),	2:	141–173
 159
you personally are left or right wing?”) were both assessed on an eleven-
point scale with higher values indicating stronger satisfaction with democ-
racy and expression of right wing attitudes, respectively.
Attitudes towards the role of religion in politics and political corruption 
were assessed with items “Good politicians believe in god” and “Politicians 
are corrupt”, respectively. Participants’ level of interest in politics was also 
measured as a single item predictor. The two attitudes were measured on a 
five-point scale (from 0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree), whereas 
level of interest in politics was assessed on a four-point scale (from 0 = not 
at all interested to 3 = very interested).
In measuring justification for violence, participants were presented 
with eight scenarios and asked in which of them violence can be justified 
(e.g. to overthrow a government, to protect jobs from being cut or to pro-
tect your ethnic/racial group). A five-point scale with higher value indicat-
ing higher justification for violence was used. A justification for violence 
scale was created as a linear combination of these eight items (Cronbach’s 
α = .93).
With regards to trust in national institutions, participants expressed 
their level of trust in thirteen institutions and organisations on an eleven-
point scale, with higher value indicating higher trust. Only items referring 
to political institutions were included in the construction of the trust in 
national political institutions scale (Cronbach’s α = .86).
Attitudes towards minority groups were measured with six items (e.g. 
“Muslims make a positive contribution to society”, “The police should be 
stricter with Roma”) on a five-point scale. The items were combined into a 
marginally reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .70), which was used as a meas-
ure of overall attitude towards minority groups (higher values indicated 
more positive attitudes towards minority groups).
Knowledge of national politics was assessed with items “Who is the 
head of the Croatian government?”, “Who is the Croatian foreign min-
ister?”, and “What is the main ruling party or coalition in Croatia?”. A 
knowledge of national politics index was created as a linear combination 
of the scores ranging from 0 (zero correct answers) to 3 (three correct an-
swers). Internal reliability was low (KR–20 = .58).
Predictor were entered into the regression model in a hierarchical, 
block-wise fashion. Socio-demographic variables were included in the first 
block whereas the remaining set of predictors was included in the second 
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block. Predictors in both blocks were included in a model simultaneously 
using the enter method.
4.3. Quantitative analysis results
Young people in our sample expressed a moderate preference for a strong 
leader (M = 2.53; Table 1). More than half of the participants (54.7%) be-
lieved that having a strong leader not constrained by parliament is a very 
good or fairly good type of political system.
Table 1. Range, mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the outcome 
(Preference for a strong leader) and quantitative predictor variables
Range M SD
Preference for a strong leader 0–4 2.53 1.24
Political corruption 0–4 3.06 0.88
Justification for violence 0–32 12.56 7.96
Trust in national political institutions 0–50 19.15 9.74
Satisfaction with democracy in Croatia 0–10 4.76 2.37
Left–right political ideology 0–10 4.95 2.38
Role of religion in politics 0–4 1.53 1.14
Attitudes towards minority groups 0–24 12.32 3.44
Interest in politics 0–3 1.26 0.91
Level of political knowledge 0–3 2.37 0.84
On average, participants had a very negative attitude towards politi-
cians (M = 3.06), with 73.8% agreeing or strongly agreeing with the 
statement “Politicians are corrupt”. Among all predictors, that attitude had 
the strongest correlation with preference for a strong leader suggesting 
the role of the “bad elite” concept in the description of populism (Table 
2). The other two items depicting anti-systemic attitudes indicated that 
the youth have a low level of trust in national political institutions (M 
= 19.15) and that they are neither dissatisfied nor satisfied with the way 
democracy works in Croatia (M = 4.76). Although the mean value on 
the scale of satisfaction with democracy points to a moderate level of 
satisfaction, it should be noticed that almost 40% of participants chose 
value 6 or higher on the scale ranging to 10, suggesting an overall high 
degree of dissatisfaction with democracy. These two anti-systemic items 
were correlated with the preference for a strong leader in the expected 
direction, but the effects were small.
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Authoritarianism, as a second core concept of populism, was meas-
ured with a composite measure of justification for violence. On average, 
participants expressed moderately low support towards using violence for 
achieving certain goals (M = 12.56). As expected, justification for violence 
was positively correlated with preference for a strong leader (r = 0.18).
We have assessed nativism as the third core concept of populism, with 
attitudes towards minority groups and towards religion’s influence in pol-
itics. On average, young people expressed neither positive nor negative 
attitudes towards minority groups (M = 12.32), whereas attitude towards 
religion’s influence in politics suggested that young people on average have 
negative attitudes towards the role of religion in politics (M = 1.53). Half 
of the participants from our sample disagree or strongly disagree with the 
statement “Good politicians believe in god”. Both the association of that 
item and of attitudes towards minority groups both showed that stronger 
nativist sentiment leads to higher preference for a strong leader (Table 2).
Regarding self-positioning on a left–right political ideology scale, most 
participants placed themselves close to the mid-range value, with 37.8% se-
lecting a neutral point on an eleven-point scale. Leaning towards right-wing 
ideology was positively correlated with preferences for a strong leader (r 
= 0.12). Finally, young people, despite their relatively high knowledge of 
national politics20 (M = 2.37), expressed a relatively low interest in national 
politics (M = 1.26). More than two thirds of young people (67.3%) are not 
very interested or not interested at all in politics. Higher interest in politics 
was negatively associated (r = –0.10), whereas political knowledge had no 
connection with the preference for a strong leader (r = –0.06).
At the multivariate level, multiple regression analysis was conducted 
with preference for a strong leader as the outcome. Socio-demographic vari-
ables included in the first step of the regression analysis accounted for only 
1% of the variance of the outcome, indicating a non-significant increase in 
comparison to the null model (Table 3.). After the entry of nine predictors 
in the second step, the model significantly improved. It explained 11.9% of 
the variance in preference for a strong leader, and seven predictors proved 
statistically significant.
20 More precisely, 47.9% of participants provided correct answers on all three questions, 
31.6% had two correct answers, 11.8% had only one and 8.7% had zero correct answers. 
However, it should be emphasised that we measured knowledge on national politics with 
only three very basic questions, which presents a threat to the construct validity of this 
measure due to narrow operationalisation.
Rev za soc 2016-2.indb   162 11.12.2016.   19:37:57
	 Augustin	Derado,	Vanja	Dergić,	Vanja	Međugorac:	Croatian	Youth...,	Revija	za	sociologiju	46	(2016),	2:	141–173
 163
Table 3. Regression analysis results for Preference for a strong leader as 
the outcome





Constant 2.38 .22 –
.01 1.211(6, 705)
Gender .00 .09 .00
Age dummy 1 –.05 .16 –.02
Age dummy 2 –.26 .16 –.10
Education dummy 1 –.01 .17 .00
Education dummy 2 .18 .20 .06





Constant 1.23 .42 –
.119 6.269**(15, 696)
Gender .09 .09 .04
Age dummy 1 –.02 .15 –.01
Age dummy 2 –.17 .15 –.07
Education dummy 1 –.05 .16 –.02
Education dummy 2 .12 .19 .04
Location .22* .09 .09
Political corruption .24** .06 .17
Justification for violence .02** .01 .13
Trust in national institutions .02** .01 .13
Satisfaction with democracy 
in Croatia –.04* .02 –.08
Left–right political ideology .05* .02 .09
Role of religion in politics .10* .04 .09
Attitudes towards minority 
groups –.03* .01 –.08
Interest in politics –.07 .05 –.05
Level of political knowledge –.05 .06 –.03
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
Political corruption had the highest predictive value (β = .17), fol-
lowed by justification for violence scale and trust in national political in-
stitutions (β = .13). The importance of these two variables in predicting 
preference for a strong leader points to the importance of the “bad elite” 
Rev za soc 2016-2.indb   163 11.12.2016.   19:37:57
Augustin Derado, Vanja Dergić, Vanja Međugorac: Croatian Youth..., Revija za sociologiju 46 (2016), 2: 141–173
164
core concept and authoritarianism for populism. The bivariate association 
between the outcome and the scale of trust in national political institutions 
was supressed, as evident from the statistically significant beta value (β = 
.13) and the non-significant bivariate correlation (Table 2). Predictors of 
satisfaction with democracy, left–right political ideology, role of religion 
in politics and attitudes towards minority groups were significant at p < 
.05, with modest beta weights. Lastly, the interest in politics and level of 
political knowledge proved to be non-significant as predictors, despite a 
significant bivariate correlation of interest in politics with the outcome (r 
= –.10). All the associations were of the expected directions.
5. Conclusions
In this study, the “breeding ground” for populism among the youth in Za-
greb was analysed using the data obtained during 2012 and 2013 within 
the FP7 project MYPLACE. Mixed methods thematic analysis of 61 semi-
structured interviews and qualitative analysis on a survey sample of 1,216 
young people aged 16–25 was employed. It is important to emphasise that 
the study results were situated in the context of an economic crisis in Croa-
tia and the youths’ general discontent with politics and politicians. The 
qualitative analysis indicated that such attitudes run deep among young 
people, who are alienated from the political system. Interviewees primarily 
viewed important political and even some civic institutions as dysfunction-
al, which indicated that there is a foundation for the demand for populist 
politics, as “the institutional system has to be [...] broken if the populist 
appeal is to be effective” (Laclau, 2005b: 177). Given the (mis)uses of the 
term populism in the political and media discourse in Croatia (cf. footnote 
1), it is not surprising that only a minority of the interviewees were familiar 
with it, and they almost exclusively related it to the mode of communica-
tion that can be found in mainstream politics. Most of them recognised and 
condemned patterns of behaviour among the mainstream politicians and po-
litical parties that correspond to populist strategies (mainstream populism). 
Narratives about the “real” populist parties were noted in very few inter-
views, and they were connected to radical right populist actors in the West.
The qualitative analysis of interviewees opinions analogue to three 
core concepts of populism (the “good people”, the “bad elite” and the 
“general will”; Mudde, 2004) indicated a potential “breeding ground” for 
radical populism among the youth in Croatia. Most of our interviewees 
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considered political elites corrupt and dysfunctional (“bad elite”), and many 
emphasised that the people should have more direct influence on politics, 
communicating their opinions and needs almost univocally as a correc-
tive to the “bad elite”, pointing to the core concepts of “general will” and 
“good people”. Interviewees also perceived a certain spread of nationalism 
and radical egalitarianism (common ideological features of populism) in 
the general population. In regard to nationalism, a few of our interviewees 
showed some suspicion towards Serbs and were somewhat prone to na-
tionalist attitudes.21 Regarding egalitarianism, many interviewees demanded 
more equality and a strong social economy with high levels of economic 
and job security. Several interviewees were nostalgic about the egalitarian 
socialist Yugoslav past.22 
A few of the interviewees spoke explicitly of their preference for a 
leader with great powers to pull the country out of hardships. They ex-
pressed the desire for one person to end the “endless arguing” of gov-
ernments and oppositions and to follow the “real” needs of the “people”, 
thus disrupting the usual democratic process and concentrating the political 
executive power in the function to carry out the will of the “people” and 
“make things better for the ‘people’”. Such preferences correspond to a 
populist type of rule, not ignoring its authoritarian contents (see the intro-
duction and particularly the aim of the study sections for a more detailed 
review of the issue). Interviews have also established that young people 
in Zagreb have rather limited knowledge of history, particularly regarding 
the critical assessment of the contested periods of Croatian political past.23 
That indicates a possible absence of crucial safeguards against the rise of 
new radical political projects.
In the quantitative part of this study, the analysis was narrowed and 
focused to a single dimension of populism: its radical right-wing variant. 
21 Survey results corroborated insights from the interviews and showed that 21.8% of par-
ticipants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “You can never be careful enough 
with Serbs”, whereas 42.8% of participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with this state-
ment. In line with this, many interviewees criticised nationalism that spreads intolerance 
towards Serbs.
22 Of course, the demands for greater economic and job security can be interpreted as 
demands for a strong social welfare state such as the Nordic Welfare State systems, pres-
ently under a dismantling process (Baeten, Berg and Hansen, 2015).
23 For example, the period of the Independent State of Croatia, a fascist puppet state 
(1941–1945), or the period of socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1991).
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Accordingly, the aim of our quantitative analysis was to examine the con-
nections of a battery of survey questions indicating radical right populism 
to the type of political radicalism that supports a political system with a 
strong leader not constrained by the institution of the democratic parliament 
(the outcome variable).
Searching for the predictors of the demand-side populism among the 
population is a demanding task as (potential) voters are always more heter-
ogeneous than most studies expect (Mudde, 2007). Thus, it is not surprising 
that our regression model accounted for a modest amount of variance of the 
preference for a strong leader (11.9%). In spite of that, the results indicated 
that two predictors – attitudes towards political corruption and justification 
of violence – had a notable contribution in explaining the preference for 
a strong leader. The importance of political corruption is in line with the 
importance of anti-elitist and anti-systemic attitudes in populism (Cano-
van, 1999; Meny and Surel, 2002; Arditi, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 
2007). Regression analysis results indicated a slight skew to the right on 
the political spectrum of youth who are more inclined to support strong 
leaders. Many studies on the radical right variant of populism (Mudde, 
2007; Flecker, 2004; Norris, 2005; Turner, 2009 [2005]; Kymlicka, 2003) 
emphasised the role of nativist, anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes as 
some the most significant predictors of populism.
This research indicated the existence of the “breeding ground” for pop-
ulism among Croatian youth. However, it should be highlighted that it is 
a “notorious fact that young people faithfully mirror the image of society 
in which they grew up” (Ilišin, 2015: 41). The analyses demonstrated that 
the youth is prepared to consider significant changes to get better political 
leadership and a better life, even if it means rejecting some dimensions of 
the representative liberal democratic system and choosing a strong leader 
to govern the country. Regardless of the identified inclinations towards 
populism, there were no relevant populist actors and parties in Croatia at 
the time the research was conducted. This may be due to a supply-side 
issue, perhaps the most important factor being the democratisation stimu-
lated by the institutional and the political influence of the European Union 
(Beširević, 2012; Dolenec, 2013). However, the size of the economic crisis 
in Croatia and the level of dissatisfaction with the two biggest political 
parties in Croatia (and their traditional coalition partners) could open doors 
for various protest parties. Nevertheless, the demand-side analysis is lim-
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ited, and wide support for the ideas of democracy exists in Croatia, which 
is confirmed both in the qualitative and quantitative results of this study. 
Therefore, the realisation of inclinations to populist alternatives depends on 
many factors, not alone the supply of potent populist actors. As Van der 
Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005) emphasised, a vote aimed at punishing 
political elites is qualitatively different from a regime protest vote, one that 
aims to change the political system and main political ideologies.
The study was limited by several notable shortcomings. Despite proba-
bilistic sampling, relatively low contact and response rates may have been a 
source of bias in the sample selection. In addition, the results of this study 
cannot be generalised to the entire youth population of Zagreb or Croatia 
as sampling was limited to two city districts. Nonetheless, the authors be-
lieve that the results are indicative of socio-political trends specific to the 
Croatian context and useful given the lack of research on the phenomenon. 
Measures used for operationalisation of key constructs were limited as well. 
The shortcomings of using a single item of preference for a strong leader 
as a measure of populism are addressed in detail throughout the study. 
However, the findings of significant correlations between strong leader 
preference and anti-elite and some right-wing attitudes are indicative of its 
construct validity. Populism is generally an under-researched phenomenon 
in Croatia, and demand-sides studies such as this one are still rare even 
in the international literature. Reliable and valid quantitative measures of 
populist preference are still under development, and the attempts made by 
Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) are commendable. However, at the 
time the MYPLACE project was conceptualised (2010–2011), populism 
was primarily considered a right-wing phenomenon and our survey was 
designed accordingly. Using justification of violence as a proxy measure 
of authoritarianism, as well as measuring knowledge on national politics 
with only three items undermined validity of the measures. The authors 
emphasise the need for better operationalisation of such constructs in future 
research. Likewise, the measurement of constructs such as role of religion 
in politics and political corruption with more than one item would certainly 
increase their metric properties. Finally, cross sectional design of the study 
prevents any inference of causality between predictors and the outcome. 
Instead, the relationship is exclusively driven by theory. As for the quali-
tative part of the research, it should be considered primarily as a broad 
contextualisation of populism amongst the youth in Zagreb, suitable to the 
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explorative character of this study and the under-researched, elusive, phe-
nomenon of populism. Further research is needed to explore the character 
of youth inclinations towards populism, as well as their protest against the 
political elites in Croatia and the system they shaped. Thus, an in-depth 
examination of youth understanding of the concept of democracy and their 
knowledge of the “dark sides” of historical radical political regimes should 
be conducted.
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Recentne međunarodne studije izvještavaju o porastu izbornog uspjeha populistič-
kih političkih stranaka među mlađom populacijom. U ovom je radu istraženo postoji 
li »plodno tlo« za prihvaćanje populizma među mladima u Zagrebu na temelju hr-
vatskih rezultata projekta Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement 
(MYPLACE). Korištena je mješovita metoda – tematska analiza 61 polustruktu-
riranog intervjua i regresijska analiza provedena na anketnim podacima priku-
pljenim na uzorku od 1.216 mladih u dobi od 16 do 25 godina. Kvalitativna je 
analiza indicirala postojanje analogija u političkim stavovima intervjuiranih mla-
dih s trima idejama koje su u temelju modela populizma Casa Muddea (»narod je 
dobar i pravedan«, »politička elita je pokvarena« i »treba se provoditi opća volja 
naroda«). Također, dio je sugovornika zastupao neke od uobičajenih ideoloških 
komponenti populizma – nacionalizam i radikalni egalitarizam. U kvantitativ-
nom dijelu rada analiza je sužena na samo jednu dimenziju populizma – radikal-
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nu desnu varijantu. S obzirom na to da u vrijeme istraživanja u Hrvatskoj nisu 
postojale utjecajnije populističke stranke, analiza je s podržavanja političkih stra-
naka usmjerena na podržavanje ideja. Za kriterijsku varijablu regresijske analize 
izabrana je preferencija političkog sustava s jakim vođom koji nije pod kontrolom 
parlamenta. Ta preferencija, uz autoritarna svojstva, sadržava i jak populistički 
potencijal u suvremenim demokracijama. Analize su pokazale da su stavovi pro-
tiv elita i protiv sustava institucija kod mladih povezani s preferencijom nedemo-
kratskoga jakog vođe, kao i autoritarnost te nekoliko radikalnijih desnih stavova. 
I kvalitativni i kvantitativni nalazi upućuju na to da postoji plodno tlo za razvoj 
populizma među mladima u Zagrebu, no potrebne su daljnje studije kako bi se 
istražio taj kompleksan i u Hrvatskoj dosad gotovo neistražen fenomen.
Ključne riječi: mladi, populizam, demokracija, autoritarnost, radikalni desni 
populizam
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